This paper picks up the seminal model of Venables (1996) and provides a quantifying concept for the sectoral coherence in vertical-linkage models of the New Economic Geography. Based upon an alternative approach to solve the model and to determine critical trade cost values, this paper focuses on the interdependencies between agglomeration, specialization and the strength of vertical linkages. A central concern is the idea of an 'industrial base,' which is attracting linked industries but is persistent to relocation. As a main finding, the intermediate cost share and substitution elasticity basically determine the strength of linkages. Thus, these parameters affect how strong the industrial base responds to changes in trade costs, relative wages and market size.
Introduction
The New Economic Geography (NEG), initially introduced by Krugman (1991) , provides explanations for industrial agglomeration based upon increasing returns and imperfect competition. Whereas international labor mobility initiates the central agglomeration mechanism in the core-periphery model, the observation that industrial clustering also is present in regions with relatively low migration has challenged the application of inter-industrial trade as an additional agglomeration force.
In their analysis of European industries, Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) Yeats (1998) , who considers the exports of the OECD countries within the classification group SITC-7 (key machinery and transportation equipment). In 1995, the share of components and parts was about 30%, which approximates $132 billion (US). Characterizing the relevance of vertical linkages in expanding international trade, Hummels et al. (1998) come to the conclusion that the nature of international trade 'has changed to the point where countries increasingly specialize in producing particular stages of goods, rather than making a complete good from start to finish'.
Based upon the seminal works of Ethier (1982) , Rivera-Batiz (1988) and Markusen (1989) , Krugman and Venables (1995) For simplification, both sectors are integrated into one so that the manufacturing firms produce their own intermediates. In contrast, Venables (1996) separates the sectoral structure and analyzes the particular spatial distribution of both upstream and downstream industries. A couple of additional publications picked up the vertical-linkage (VL) mechanism. Baldwin et al. (2003) classify these models into:
i) CPVL models in the course of Krugman and Venables (1995) ; ii) FEVL models, 1 Estimation for 1995.
which are based upon the footloose-entrepreneur framework (Ottaviano (2002) ); and iii) FCVL (footloose capital) models due to Robert-Nicoud (2002) .
In the context of existing NEG literature considering vertical linkages, the dimension of industrial agglomeration depends upon four categories of factors: i) trade costs; ii) local production costs; iii) local market size; and iv) the strength of vertical linkages. The higher the trade costs, the stronger firms tend to locate at the larger market for reducing the costs of spatial transfers. In contrast, at low trade costs, local cost advantages become more important than local market size. Including inter-industrial trade, the allocation between upstream and downstream sectors is characterized by mutual interdependencies, which are also referred to as forward and backward linkages. The forward linkage describes the dependency of the upstream industry upon the downstream industry: the larger the downstream sector, the larger is the relevant market for the intermediate sector. The backward linkage results from the price-index effect: the more firms produce in the upstream sector, the higher is the competitive pressure implying decreasing intermediate prices, which finally decrease the procurement costs of the downstream industry. It is applied for both mechanisms: the larger one sector is, the larger is the other.
Although the strength of vertical linkages is attributed to be an important factor for industrial clustering, it only is discussed casually. For quantification, a frequently used reference is the share of downstream costs for intermediate products. This approach raises certain questions: Is the strength of linkages an endogenous or exogenous factor? What are the main factors controlling industrial interdependencies, and is the strength of linkages fixed or variable? Can the sectoral coherence be described as one measure, or does it require a separate analysis dealing with forward and backward linkages?
In comparison with the diversity of models considering vertical linkages, the Venables (1996) model shows a number of distinctive features. First, it is the only partial-analytical model, which describes agglomeration and the characteristic bifurcation pattern of NEG models. In this context, it allows to focus on industrial linkages without income and labor market effects. Second, due to the disaggregated sectoral set up, the Venables model gives insight into firm behavior in both upstream and downstream sectors, and thus, it opens the potential to reproduce vertical spe-cialization. Third, it directly refers to the strength of inter-industrial linkages and its impact upon the spatial distribution of both sectors. However, the model also features some difficulties. The modeling framework is comparatively complex including four boundary conditions and twofold price-index and home-market effects. Furthermore, the model results are only given in relative values rather than absolute firm numbers in both sectors. The paper also leaves some open questions regarding the sustain point, a more detailed description of the boundary and stability conditions, exogenous asymmetries between locations, and political implications.
Against this background, the objective of this paper is to suggest a concept for quantifying the strength of vertical linkages in NEG models. Further on, it explicitly considers the Venables model in terms of the absolute size of industries, and thus, it provides an alternative approach to determine the break and sustain point, as well as the specialization point where vertical specialization breaks off for decreasing trade costs. Moreover, Venables (1996) approaches the idea of an 'industrial base,' which describes a sufficient market size and presence of suppliers to attract and maintain additional firms in one particular location. This paper complements these considerations i) by the classification of industries by means of the strength of linkages; and ii) by quantifying the inertia of the downstream industry with respect to a relocation of the upstream industry. Finally, it considers exogenous asymmetries in terms of wage rate and market size and their impact upon agglomeration and specialization. In this context, it also includes a subsidization policy for compensating disadvantages in country size.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the basic model of a closed economy to analyze vertical linkages and to develop a measuring concept of the linkage strength. In Section 3, we refer to the standard Venables model and consider equilibria, stability, critical trade costs values, and the impact of linkage strength. Section 4 focuses on the effects of exogenous asymmetries. The last section returns to the idea of an industrial base and draws the main conclusions based upon the modeling results.
Closed Economy
In this section, we consider a simple supply chain consisting of an upstream industry forwarding intermediate products to a downstream industry, which manufactures final products for private consumers. Both sectors are characterized by increasing returns and monopolistic competition.
Consumer Demand
Starting from consumer preferences, the private households face a linear-homogenous utility function in the form of:
where M represents a sub-utility from the consumption of manufactures, A is the quantity of a homogenous (outside) good, and µ the share in private expenditures for manufactures. The sub-utility, M , is given by: for concavity it is defined to be greater than 1.
The demand for manufactures can be derived by two-stage budgeting:
where p d denotes the downstream price, and µY the share in income of the private households spent on consumer goods. P d is the consumer price index, defined as:
Equation (4) reveals the price-index effect: an increase in product variety reduces the price index because a given level of subutility can be achieved with a lower quantity of a particular product sort.
Downstream Industry
Based upon Ethier (1982) , the technology for final good production is given by a implicit Cobb-Douglas type production function:
The right hand side of equation (5) 
where the superscript u denotes upstream.
Production function and intermediate aggregate are structurally the same as utility and sub-utility functions in which ς corresponds with σ. The common pattern involving downstream and consumer preferences implies a price index for intermediates that is similar to the one for consumer goods:
By applying two-stage-budgeting again, we obtain the cost function of one downstream firm:
The downstream costs positively depend on the wage level, w, on the fixed and variable costs, 
Summing up, the downstream profit function is given by:
Substituting consumer demand (3) and differentiation yield the profit maximizing downstream price:
Equation (11) Using this simplification, the equilibrium output of a downstream firm following from zero-profits is:
Upstream Industry
The upstream industry produces intermediates by use of a linear technology given by:
where l u is the amount of labor required to produce one unit of upstream output.
The corresponding upstream profit function can be written as:
The profit maximizing upstream price is by use of intermediate demand (9):
Again, we use a standard normalization: a u = (ς − 1) /ς, so that the equilibrium output of one upstream firm is:
Equilibrium Firm Number
Market clearing in both the upstream and downstream sectors requires total supply being equal to total demand. In terms of the upstream industry holds:
From (17) the number of upstream firms can be determined by substituting equations (8), (9), (15), and (16):
Similarly, the downstream market clearing condition is:
Accordingly, the downstream firm number is by use of (3), (11), and (12):
Equations (18) and (20) Figure 1 illustrates the equilibrium by means of equations (18) 
The derivatives quantify the change in the number of firms in one sector, in response to changes in the quantity of firms in the other sector. If we choose the point elasticities based upon equations (22), we obtain:
These elasticities can be considered to be a measure for the strength of inter-sectoral The isoclines for a given elasticity are linear, with the slope, (1 −ε u ) /ε u , for the forward linkage andε d for the backward linkage. This implies that an increase in ς must go along with an increase in α to maintain a certain level of linkage strength.
All in all, this measuring concept has a couple of implications:
• The sectoral coherence is a bi-directional relationship of forward and backward linkages, so that the strength of linkages is composed of two measurements.
• The strengths of both linkages are converse, which implies that the higher the strength of the forward linkage, the weaker is the backward linkage and vice versa. This constellation also excludes combination of mutual weak or strong linkages.
• The sum of both elasticities as a rough aggregate for the overall sectoral coherence is always larger than 1, increasing with α, and decreasing with ς.
All in all, the common approach used in the NEG literature to quantify the strength of linkages by the intermediate cost share is not sufficient to display the whole mechanism between vertically linked sectors, as this closed economy framework reveals.
Open Economy
For considering the impact of different linkage strengths, this section refers to the partial model introduced by Venables (1996) . This model analyzes the supply chain described in the previous section within an open economy with two locations. While the workforce is immobile, the output of the upstream and downstream industries are internationally tradable, which causes Samuelson iceberg trade costs, t > 1.
Preferences and technologies are the same across both locations, whereas market size and wages are allowed to differ.
In accordance with equations (4) and (7), the price indices are:
where upstream and downstream prices depend upon local costs:
α . Based upon equation (8), the downstream cost functions become:
The upstream industry supplies downstream demand, whereas the proportion of intermediates, which are forwarded to the foreign location, has to be t times higher because this amount melts away en route.
Downstream output follows equation (3):
Because of zero-profits, both upstream and downstream output is fixed at ςF u and σF d , respectively, which implies the same fixed firm size in both locations.
Furthermore, we add two market clearing conditions for both sectors according to (17) and (19):
where the left-hand sides represent supply and the right-hand sides demand.
Overall, the equations (24) - (30) The location decision of manufacturing firms is due to the tension of local market size and production costs. Because of the sectoral linkages, the downstream firms do not only locate at the larger sales market, but also account for the presence of suppliers due to the (intermediate) price-index effect. In turn, the upstream industry locates not only in response to local labor costs, but also to the size of the local downstream industry. However, with decreasing trade costs, differences in labor costs become more and more relevant, which weakens the linkage to the relevant sales market. In extreme, it is possible that trade costs become so low that the whole industry locates in one location and exports to the other, which is also known as the core-periphery outcome. Also in the case of initially symmetric countries, the model generates a core-periphery constellation for sufficiently low trade costs.
Interior and Corner Solutions
Considering two locations, which are symmetric in terms of market size, consumer preferences, technology and labor costs, Figure 3 maps the equilibrium set of the downstream firm number with respect to trade costs. However, the set of corner solutions is defined by two non-zero conditions: First, the red dotted line illustrates the zero-profit firm number of downstream firms in the periphery. Second, the green dotted line represents the restriction given by zero upstream firms (expressed in terms of downstream firms).
The first restriction implies that as soon as this curve exceeds the lower corner solution, the firm number in the periphery decreases until the downstream profits are zero. Because firms leave the market, if profits become negative, the zero-profit restriction holds for positive firm numbers as being the peripheral corner solution.
The zero-profit restriction can be determined by equating (28). By use of equation (??) and the downstream price indices (25) follows:
where η is defined to be: Y 2 /Y 1 . A bar on top a variable represents the core and below the peripheral equilibrium state. In the next step, from the downstream market clearing condition (30) follows:
Substituting this expression into equation (31) yields the zero-downstream profit restrictions:
For the upper bound holds:
The critical trade cost value, t C , at which downstream specialization breaks off, can be determined by simply setting (33) equal to zero. The corresponding value solves:
The second restriction (green dotted line) can be determined by equating (27), which implies zero upstream profits. Solving for the peripheral downstream firm number yields:
Substituting this expression into (32) again leads to the lower bound:
In consequence, the upper bound is:
Furthermore, at the sustain point, t S , at which the corner solutions become stable, two conditions must be fulfilled: i) The zero-downstream profit restriction holds (profits in the core turn from negative to positive); and ii) the upstream firm number in the periphery becomes zero so that the second restriction holds. Thus, the sustain point occurs, where the red curves intersect the green curves, and accordingly equation (33) is equal to (37). The corresponding trade cost value solves:
Stability Analysis
The stability of equilibria is ascertained by firm profits again, as assumed in the previous section and equation (47) With regard to stability, an equilibrium is assumed to be stable (unstable), if the marginal profit is negative (positive). In terms of the symmetric equilibrium, the stability alternates from stable to unstable if the slope of the profit function becomes zero, which is denoted as the break point. By totally differentiating the equation system at this point, the break point level of trade costs can be determined:
Moreover, Figure 4 shows the behavior of the corner solutions with respect to the variability of non-negativity conditions. For decreasing trade costs, the zero- Comparing break, sustain, and specialization points, all three critical trade cost values are implicitly defined. Numerical investigation reveals that the sustain point occurs first for increasing trade integration, whereas the ranking of break and spe- constellation: σ = 3, F = 1). As the numerical example reveals, the break point generally increases in α and decreases with ς. In this context, equation (40) shows a linear relationship between cost share and substitution elasticity for a constant break point. This implies that an increase in the cost share can be compensated by a decrease in the substitution elasticity so that the break point remains unchanged.
Furthermore, the specialization point, t C increases with α, but is independent from ς, as equation (35) 
The Inertia of the Downstream Industry
For quantifying the "inertia" of the downstream industry, the area between zerodownstream profit restriction and the lower bound provides information about how many downstream firms remain in the periphery since the agglomeration process has started. The inertia, Θ, is defined to be the integral of equation (33) between the sustain and specialization points: Figure 5. 3) The graph is non-monotonous with respect to α (and for ς, not displayed). For low α-and ς-values, the inertia increases with an increase in both parameters, whereas for higher values the correlation is negative. The strength of linkages discussed in the preceding section provides an explanation for these nonmonotonicities. According to equation (23b), an increase in α and a decrease in ς implies an increasing backward linkage (BL), which leads to an increase in all three critical trade cost values. Thereby, the distance between sustain and specialization points tends to expand, and thus to increase the inertia of the downstream industry due to a stronger dependency upon the upstream sector. However, the numerical calibration reveals that an increasing backward linkage also tends to decrease the zero-profit restriction at the sustain point, as indicated at the Ω-values in Table 1 .
All in all, a rise in the backward linkage strength increases the interval [t
decreases the height of the integral Θ. Finally, the interaction between these effects produces the shape as well as the non-monotonicities of the graph in Figure 5 .
Comparative Advantage vs. Market Size
Deviating from the assumption of symmetric locations, this part considers the impact of differences in local wages and country sizes. Having a look at Figure 4 again, a decrease in the local wage rate leads to a shifting of the corresponding profit function downwards, while an increase in local income shifts the function upwards. Figure 6 illustrates the downstream firm number in both locations for the case that the wage rate in location 1 is lower than in location 2 (w 1 = 0.95, w 2 = 1).
[Insert Figure 6 about here.]
As both diagrams reveal, the bifurcation pattern becomes more complex compared with the symmetric case. The boundary conditions shift, especially the curve for the zero-upstream firm number is distorted towards the upper and lower bounds.
Furthermore, the number of sustain points may vary. In this context, the subscripts denote the location where the industry agglomerates, and the superscripts denote the sustain point, S, and the corresponding numbering. In the lower diagram of Figure 6 , for instance, two sustain points of agglomeration in location 2 and one sustain point for agglomeration in location 1 occur. The ascription as to which location becomes the core and which one becomes the periphery is still ambiguous.
However, the initially symmetric stable path is bent towards the location with the comparative advantage so that it increasingly benefits from trade integration. For trade costs lower than the break point level, location 1 tends to be the industrialized core region. The sustain points can be computed by the same approach discussed above:
Equations (42) and (43) Moreover, the specialization points, t C 1 and t C 2 , differ, and can be determined by solving:
Based upon these outcomes, the same implications hold for the case that one country is larger than its neighbor. The home-country and price index effect produce a relocation tendency towards the location with the larger market size. This implies an upward shift of the profit function in Figure 4 . Hence, there exists a wage differential which totally compensates the effect of a difference in country sizes (for small deviations from symmetry).
Considering this situation from the viewpoint of the smaller country, it might be a political option to subsidize the local industry for initiating a relocation process due to a comparative cost advantage. In this context, Figure 7 shows the required wage rate in the smaller location (here, location 1) by means of the standard numerical example (Y 2 = 1.1).
[Insert Figure 7 about here.]
As apparent, symmetry between locations in terms of firm number, and thus of the total industrial output, is only realizable either in the upstream sector or in the downstream sector. For low trade costs (to the left of the intersection), the wage rate is higher, and thus the subsidy lower, for achieving downstream symmetry compared with the wage rate required to generate upstream symmetry. For high trade costs (to the right of the intersection), the situation is reversed. The trade cost value, where both curves intersect, converges to the break point level for a decreasing size asymmetry.
If we consider a situation of t = 4, for instance, a wage rate given on the upstreamsymmetry curve produces an intermediate output, which is identical in both locations, but the downstream sector still shows a relocation tendency towards the larger country. If we further decrease the wage rate until the downstream-symmetry curve is reached, the upstream sector agglomerates in the smaller locations, whereas the downstream sector is equalized. For t = 1.5, for instance, a wage rate set on the upstream-symmetry level initiates a downstream agglomeration for the smaller country, while the upstream industry is evenly distributed. A wage rate below both curves implies agglomeration of upstream and downstream sectors in the smaller location.
Alternatively, it might be a political objective to equalize the total amount of manufactures as an aggregate; thus, to equalize the industrial employment in both coun-
In the case of the standard example, the firm size can be neglected because it is the same in both locations and sectors. As a result of this policy, the upstream firm number in the smaller location is higher and the downstream firm number is lower than in the larger country. All in all, we face a situation of a relative upstream specialization in location 1, and a relative downstream specialization in location 2.
Concluding Remarks
As the Venables model reveals, vertical specialization only occurs in terms of a total specialization of the periphery in downstream activities. Thus, vertical specialization is a result of a successive relocation first of the upstream industry, thereafter of the downstream industry for decreasing trade costs. The inertia discussed in this paper quantifies this specialization effect, which is primarily controlled by the backward linkage. A perfect vertical specialization where one location focuses on upstream and the other location on downstream production is excluded.
If we return to the initial question of an industrial base and summarizing the main results, the strength of linkages quantified by the approach discussed in this paper differs from the existing literature. First, we obtain two values for the sectoral coherence with respect to forward and backward linkage, whereas the stronger one linkage, the weaker is the antagonistic one. Second, beside the commonly used parameter cost share, α, to quantify the linkage strength, we included the intermediate substitution elasticity, ς, as a further determinant.
The inertia of the downstream industry suggests itself for a criterion to identify industries being part of the industrial base. But as Section 3 revealed, the relationship is quite complex. As we have seen, a low break point does not unnecessarily imply a high inertia and vice versa. In fact, if we choose a high-α and a low ς-industry, for instance, the break point occurs for high trade cost values indicating an early agglomeration process. In contrast, the inertia also takes high values, which implies that the downstream industry slowly detaches from the periphery. Considering industries featuring a substitution elasticity even closer to the edge of the domain, the inertia may decrease again. Overall, a general attribution of industries to the industrial base critically depends upon the parameter constellation also in regard to the consumer substitution elasticity, fixed costs, and potential country size or wage rate asymmetries.
Having a comparative advantage either due to lower wages or higher labor productivity (lower production coefficient, a) does not inevitably mean agglomeration in the corresponding location, if the relative market size is too low. In consequence, low-cost locations do not benefit if the wage rate is above the curves exemplarily plotted in Figure 7 . From the viewpoint of a larger country, this implies that as long as the wage rate in the smaller country is above both curves, the location with the larger market attracts the upstream and downstream sectors. For a wage rate in between the US-and DS-symmetry curves, the larger country releases the upstream sector for trade costs on the right of the intersection. On the left-hand side, where trade costs to the larger sales market become less relevant, the downstream industry becomes footloose and relocates before the upstream industry does.
Technical Appendix
Stability Analysis (Closed Economy)
As apparent in Figure 1 and provable by differentiating equations (17) and (19) However, to prove the stability analytically, we assume an out-of-equilibrium ad-justment process with the following characteristics:
By substitution, the relative profit functions subject to the number of upstream and downstream firms can be expressed as:
where K 1 , K 2 and K 3 > 0. Totally differentiating the profit functions (48) yields: 
Specified Equation System
For analytical traceability, the equation system is fully specified as follows:
Equation (51) is the upstream outputs, where zero-profits implies a fixed firm size in both locations. Similarly, equation (51) (56) and (57) are the market clearing conditions for the upstream and downstream sectors, respectively.
Symmetric Solution
From equating upstream and downstream firm numbers in both locations, the symmetric solution set can be found (w 1 = w 2 = 1,
Corner Solutions
Due to variability of the corner solutions with respect to trade costs, we need to distinguish between two cases: i) t < t 
The Break Point Totally differentiating the equation system (50) -(55) at the symmetric equilibrium yields:
The downstream profit function can be expressed as:
After substituting downstream demand (28a) and totally differentiating again, we obtain:
In the next step, we combine equations (66)- (69) 
